A 2008 multistate foodborne outbreak of Salmonella Saintpaul caused more than 1,400 illnesses in the United States (U.S.). Although initial investigations suggested tomatoes as the potential vehicle, jalapeño and serrano peppers were subsequently found positive for the outbreak strain.
Introduction, Research Questions, and Methodology
On May 22, 2008, the United States (U.S.) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) was notified by the New Mexico Department of Health of four people infected with the same strain of Salmonella-an unusual serotype, Salmonella Saintpaul. Three months later, a total of 1,442 cases from 43 states, the District of Columbia and Canada were reported.
Meanwhile, consumer confidence in the safety of the food supply waned 1 . This outbreak focused attention on the current system for investigation and regulation of foodborne diseases and illuminated gaps in the U.S. federal government's ability to quickly and accurately trace potentially contaminated food vehicles back to their source. Some people claimed the U.S. food safety system worked as it should and cited the isolation of a matching strain of Salmonella
Saintpaul from a jalapeño pepper in Texas and additional positive samples found on the suspected farm of origin in Mexico. However, others felt the current system for multi-state outbreak response and investigation failed and needs to be fixed 2 .
Thought leaders in food safety regulation agreed that the outbreak and subsequent investigation posed a unique level of complexity (and difficulty) rarely witnessed in public health response. However, these same leaders debate the source of the complexity. Some maintain the investigation represents an atypical incident 3, 4 for several reasons. First, most outbreaks involve one food vehicle, whereas at least two food products were contaminated with the outbreak strain of Salmonella Saintpaul in this incident. Also, neither raw jalapeño nor raw serrano peppers had been previously associated with Salmonella contamination, and little information was available regarding growth rates or survival times at the onset of this outbreak 8 .
These foods are often used in small quantities as garnishes or combined with other foods and cases might be unaware of consuming these "stealth vehicles." In the outbreak, epidemiologic analysis was complicated by the lack of large, identified clusters early in the investigation. In the initial weeks of the outbreak, most "clusters" consisted of 2-3 cases-numbers too small to determine statistical significance between foods consumed in cases versus geographically matched controls, or created marked variations in calculated odds ratios of food items between clusters, leading to some uncertainty in which foods were most likely to be associated with illness [10] [11] [12] . A further complication in the statistical analyses was that tomatoes and jalapeño or serrano peppers were often consumed together, creating a strong, collinear relationship that increased the difficulty in determining a numerical value for statistical significance of these foods individually 8 .
While many feel this outbreak was an anomaly, others point to the investigation's cumbersome intricacy as evidence of a fundamentally flawed food safety system 2 . This paper will not, and does not seek to, resolve this disagreement; instead, it seeks to address another question, the answer to which will help inform the debate:
What factors most affected the difficulty experienced during the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak and subsequent investigation, and are these factors representative of larger problems in the food system? Data for this paper were gathered from a wide range of stakeholders, including government employees of state and federal public health and food safety agencies, industry and consumer representatives, and state and national legislators (see Table 1 ). In the wake of this outbreak, Congress summoned principal participants for testimonies before the U. Administration and Related Agencies); the bulk of information is drawn from public testimony delivered before these groups. Additional data regarding the outbreak investigation were gathered from CDC and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) bulletins and reports; much of this is summarized in Table 2 . Relevant publications from several non-governmental entities were also consulted.
This paper-an exploration of a treasure trove of emerging literature regarding a recent food safety incident-draws on an inductive, yet systematic, research approach. Inductive analysis involves the gathering of data from which observations are extracted. While many view traditional, deductive methods as superior to inductive methods, a number of scholars maintain inductive research is a legitimate approach to numerous problems, particularly in the field of social science 5 . The research presented in this paper relies on methods that are highly inductive in nature; in this inductive analysis, the authors explored the range of literature regarding the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak and identified specific factors that contributed to the outbreak's complexity. The modern food system is multifaceted and complex, with government, industry, and the public playing significant roles 6 . Therefore, it is good and appropriate to analyze multiple perspectives from these groups in order to formulate ideas which best reflect the concerns and challenges of all stakeholders. Some of these perspectives (e.g., Congressional testimony) represent individual experts' opinions, but the authors accept this limitation in their overall effort to acquire multiple viewpoints. Specifically, through an inductive review of government, industry, and consumer reports (see Table 1 ) as well as multidisciplinary analyses, this study inductively proposes three factors within the current food safety system that greatly contribute to the complexity of foodborne disease outbreaks, as evidenced by the Salmonella Saintpaul investigation. These three factors form the framework in the results section.
Results
Three factors emerged as the key elements which most increased the complexity of and difficulty experienced during the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak. These included (1) delayed response due to discrepancies in resources and expertise at state and local levels, (2) inadequate communication between stakeholders and agencies, and (3) poor traceability capabilities.
Factor 1: Delayed response due to variability in resources and expertise at state and local levels
In a typical foodborne illness outbreak, clusters of cases are identified by local or state public health departments, which may solicit aid from the CDC in the form of Epi-Aid teams, usually consisting of epidemiologists, public health specialists, and Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) officers. The primary role of the CDC, which often relies on data provided by state and local personnel, is to identify potential food vehicles of infection in order to prevent further illnesses. Once a food item has been implicated (either through epidemiological or microbiological evidence), the FDA or the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is notified in order to pursue further investigation and possible regulatory action. Once the regulatory agency (USDA or FDA) has been notified, tracing the food back to the source of contamination begins.
Historically, the FDA has relied on voluntary product recalls from companies, while the USDA has enjoyed more authority to recall contaminated products.
The current food safety system relies on coordinated efforts between local, state, and federal agencies with opportunities for discrepancies in speed of response at several levels. Since CDC involvement is dependent on invitations from states, actual CDC support may be delayed. In the Salmonella Saintpaul investigation, the CDC was not formally invited to step into a coordinating role until June 3 (see Table 2 ). CDC personnel were not deployed into the field to actively participate in data collection until June 18. The inability of the CDC to act independently without the invitation of states limits the amount of federal resources applied towards epidemiological investigations.
While some state and local public health departments are well-funded and able to carry out foodborne disease outbreak investigations quickly and efficiently, many others lack adequate resources which can negatively impact investigations in several ways. In order to accomplish these goals, the CDC works closely with state public health authorities to identify outbreaks, determine common exposures, and ascertain the potential number of individuals affected or at risk. In states with highly autonomous local health departments, information sharing through the state to the CDC may not occur. Currently, in 50
states there are more than 3,000 local health departments 16 . In some states, such as Minnesota, the public health system is highly centralized with decision making authority lying with the state, whereas many other states are highly decentralized with the local public health officials holding more authority than the state in regards to cases in their area. In approximately 50% of states, local public health officials are responsible for conducting case interviews for foodborne disease, in addition to a myriad of other duties and issues-including, but not limited to, programs for immunizations, sexually transmitted diseases, and birth defects 15 . In these areas, interviews of cases to determine potential food vehicles may not occur for several weeks after the illness, leading to the possibility of inaccuracies in recall and obscuring of epidemiological relationships 17 . Unreasonably long delays in receiving information from potential cases, as well as complications arising from differing questionnaires administered by multiple individuals within a single outbreak or area, may also occur 2 . Since the CDC has relationships predominantly with states, local agencies conducting the actual investigations are often unable to easily access the valuable resources the CDC can provide.
While the FDA also collects epidemiologic information during a foodborne outbreak, its priority is to trace the implicated food vehicle back to the source, determine contributing factors leading to the contamination, and work with regulated industries to minimize the likelihood of similar circumstances recurring in the future. FDA has the responsibility to take regulatory action to prevent more contaminated foodstuffs from entering the food supply through voluntary recalls, and to collect evidence that may be used to pursue punitive measures. Since information they collect may be used in legal action against individuals or organizations, it must be able to Others have proposed similar mechanisms to facilitate information sharing 2, 23 . While Mr.
Brown acknowledges concerns on the part of the FDA in regards to confidentiality and conflict of interest on the part of industry committee members, he has not offered specific solutions for this dilemma 20 .
In addition to a lack of communication among other groups, information sharing between FDA and CDC was slow, particularly at the beginning of the outbreak. A frustration from the perspective of state personnel was the lack of uniformity in messages coming from the federal agencies, specifically the reluctance of the FDA to share information as completely as did the included lack of lot-specific labeling and mixing of products from multiple sources. In addition, 25% of facilities involved were unaware of recordkeeping requirements 29 . This highlights the need for better traceability systems in produce [30] [31] [32] .
Several common practices in the tomato industry exacerbate the traceability problem.
Tomatoes are routinely packed and repacked at several stages of production to assure uniformity of the product and are often sold individually; this commingling makes it difficult to trace the product all the way back to the farm of origin (while dramatically increasing the number of items that might potentially come into contact with the suspected pathogen) 3 . Another problem encountered by the FDA arose from the diversity of records received. At different stages of production, terminology for tomatoes may differ so that tomatoes listed as "hothouse" tomatoes by one party may be termed "tomato bulk" on the next bill of lading. The changes in nomenclature for produce at different steps in the supply chain, as well as the lack of consistently recorded information, increased the time required to follow the implicated tomatoes through distribution channels. In addition, tomatoes are perishable commodities, so by the time an illness was reported, the suspected item was no longer available for testing and similar items from the same location had also exited the food chain. This prevented testing of the implicated products for possible contamination and is a reasonable explanation for the inability to isolate the outbreak strain from tomatoes.
In the wake of the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak, several in the tomato industry have Davis stated in regard to the consumer advisory issued by FDA for tomatoes, "It is a huge disincentive for private enterprises to invest in robust food safety programs and traceability systems, if they offer no protection against industry wide shut downs by broad public health advisories.
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" During the Salmonella Saintpaul investigation, Florida-the industry leader in the design and implementation of regulations to reduce risk in tomatoes-was the last tomatoproducing area in the U.S. to be cleared by the FDA 20 and sustained economic losses estimated at $100 million 26 . In order for organizations and states (e.g., Florida) within the tomato industry to benefit from the time and money invested in establishing and adhering to these stringent guidelines, all participants must operate at this high level of record keeping and good agricultural practices.
The 2002 Bioterrorism Act was designed to address many of these concerns; however, based on the recent investigation, there are severe shortcomings in this piece of legislation.
While the Bioterrorism Act requires packers, wholesalers, and distributors to keep traceabilityrelated records for all high-risk produce in the supply chain, it does not mandate electronic recordkeeping. In addition, one expert has noted that farms, restaurants, and foreign firms are exempted from these recordkeeping requirements 33 . These omissions leave a significant gap in the chain of custody of produce between the farm and the consumer, while the lack of mandatory electronic record keeping creates chaotic amounts of paperwork that must be examined. Another failure in the Bioterrorism Act is that the authority to ensure compliance with recordkeeping standards and to seize records during a foodborne outbreak is not explicitly given to the FDA or any other federal agency 33 . In the recent outbreak, FDA had to wait up to 24 hours for companies to supply the requested information and records were sometimes incomplete. This contributed to the delay in tracing the source of implicated tomatoes, at a time when ten or more people a day might become ill. For firms that fail to comply with the recordkeeping regulations, the FDA can bring only minimal punitive actions, which arguably reduces the incentive to companies to institute and maintain acceptable recordkeeping procedures. The 2002
Bioterrorism Act was crafted with a view to minimize the burden of traceability placed on small producers; however, the projected costs of $140 million a year for more stringent requirements ought to be compared to the larger losses recently sustained by the tomato industry, due in large part to poor traceability industry-wide 33 .
Due to concerns with traceability of produce, both industry and government have been attempting to standardize information among all participants. Some worry that the costs of raising traceability standards will drive smaller producers out of business; however, the impact of Salmonella Saintpaul on the tomato industry illustrates the price of not having uniform, highly efficient traceability programs in place. Setting mandatory standards for produce traceability across the industry is an important step in the improved protection of the food supply and the prevention of future problems. Improved traceability is one important measure needed to significantly overhaul the food safety system and minimize the risk of foodborne illness 30 .
Discussion
In the aftermath of the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak, numerous agencies and individuals have scrutinized each step in the investigation in order to better prepare for future outbreaks in other commodity areas. Close examination of the decisions made and actions taken from multiple points of view demonstrate that foodborne illness outbreaks, and this one in particular,
are not simple, black-and-white episodes. In any investigation of this sort, many stakeholders, often with opposing goals or directives, are involved. While everyone agrees that the safety of the public health is paramount, the best way to achieve this goal is often debated. Regardless of personal opinions or perspectives, there are many lessons that can be learned from a thorough evaluation of the recent outbreak and investigation.
In retrospect, the most important lesson learned by all parties should be that government cannot continue to function with the current amount of resources; there is a marked need for more funding-especially at state and local levels-for foodborne surveillance and investigation.
This outbreak has revealed that the effectiveness of federal surveillance and outbreak investigations hinge on the ability of the local and state public health systems to rapidly and efficiently identify the causative pathogen and gather information from ill individuals. shown the importance of soliciting expertise from outside sources, either academic or industrial.
These external committees need to be formed, the roles clearly defined and participants carefully selected before an outbreak occurs in order to be an effective source of information in times of crises. As demonstrated by the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak, preparation needs to occur before outbreaks take place, not in the midst of them. To effectively use limited resources as wisely as possible, local, state and federal authorities must plan ahead and design ways to work with each other as well as industry and academia to protect the health of the public.
In addition, the federal government needs to reassess the degree of information federal agencies can share with outside experts in order for sufficient information exchange to occur.
The FDA, and other federal regulatory agencies, must be able to share information with partners in a timely and comprehensive manner in order to protect the nation's public health 16 .
The highly collinear relationship between tomatoes and jalapeño and serrano peppers (all of which were, at various times, suspected during the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak) obfuscated statistical associations between these items and illnesses, and posed a special challenge in the investigation. Since the precedent has now been set that "stealth vehicles" can cause large numbers of illnesses, epidemiologists may need to include additional items that are often served together in case-control studies even if there is not a strong statistical association in initial analyses. This outbreak also has illustrated the need for more data-collection and investigationmethods consistency among local and state agencies; establishing universal case questionnaires and uniform reporting requirements for common foodborne pathogens would help to ensure incoming information in a multi-state outbreak is comparable. Undoubtedly, one of the most important tools needed for better investigations in the future, is a standardized traceback system that allows produce to be efficiently followed from the end consumer back to the grower for rapid identification of the source of contamination. In order to achieve this, regulations must be implemented to require a minimum amount of information be included in electronic records kept by all parties involved in the supply chain, including those businesses selling directly to the consumer such as restaurants and grocery stores. To allow for the degree of traceability demanded by the public, items need to be clearly marked and records need to be kept at the individual or package level so items retrieved from consumers can be traced back. As demonstrated in the recent Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak, information at the lot level for tomatoes is not useful if consumers buy one or two tomatoes from a chain grocery store that may have multiple lots available at any time; in order to trace produce commonly sold individually, each item needs to have identifying information and all records need to be kept in electronic format for quick access. In order to improve the speed of response for the next foodborne outbreak and minimize the number of people affected, these topics need to be addressed to ensure that current knowledge and technology are fully exploited.
While some of these concerns were obvious before the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak, their importance has since become indisputable. For some of these, change will be difficult and require cooperative efforts from many sources; some may not have clear-cut answers. However, in order to increase the effectiveness of the food safety system, these issues must be addressed.
Only by increasing financial resources, improving cooperation and information-sharing among stakeholders, evaluating current methodologies, and implementing new tools will the universal goal of improved food safety be achieved.
Conclusion
This paper sought to answer the question: What factors most affected the difficulty experienced during the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak and subsequent investigation, and are these factors representative of larger problems in the food safety system? While the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak was unusual in many aspects and it would be foolhardy to make sweeping generalizations and reforms on the basis of one abnormal event, this investigation highlighted factors in need of improvement among all layers of government that must be addressed for our food safety system to prevent or minimize future outbreaks. Three factors that emerged included
(1) delayed response due to discrepancies in available resources and expertise at state and local levels, (2) inadequate communication between agencies and stakeholders, and (3) poor traceability capabilities. Many other topics (e.g., increased resources for the FDA, risk-based inspections and testing, equal food safety standards for imported foods and the use of GAPs, and third party auditors) have come to the forefront in connection to the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak; while the authors acknowledge the importance of these concepts, they are beyond the scope of this discussion.
The U.S. food safety system is, indeed, confronted by many formidable challenges. The emergence of new pathogens such as Escherichia coli O157:H7, the economic burden placed on the American public by repeated foodborne outbreaks, and the massive increase in produce imported from foreign countries with questionable (or nonexistent) food safety statutes demand an especially vigilant food safety system 33 . As the amount of fresh produce consumed by Americans continues to increase, lessons learned from the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak need to be applied to the current food safety system to try and prevent similar situations.
While several groups investigated whether errors may or may not have been made in the recent Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak, many people in multiple organizations at many different levels worked hard to identify the source of contamination and protect the American public. In one sense, the food safety system succeeded as the source of contamination was determined.
However, the three factors responsible for much of the difficulty experienced in the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak do, indeed, signal wider problems within the food safety system, and any legislative revision of the U.S. food safety system must address these factors. 
May 31
New Mexico Dept. of Health announces link between S. Saintpaul and red plum, red Roma and red round tomatoes.
